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On July 7, 1968 the Cabinet of the Federal Government of 
authorized the Hon. Paul Hellyer, then Minister of Transport, 
to estab11sh a Task Force on Houstng and Urban Development. The terms 
reference for the Task Force were as fo11ows: 
to examtne housing and urban development in 
Canada and to report on ways in whtch the 
federal government, tn company with other 
levels of government and the private sector 
can help meet the housing needs of a11 
Canadians and contr1butT to the development 
of modern vital cities. 
The Task force officially came to life on August 29, 1968 
lyer announced the names of Task Force members and the scope 
nature of its activities (see Appendix A). It then began a widely 
publicized tour across the country. In each of the cities·and towns 
It stopped, public hearings were organized, visits were made to 
housing projects and renewal areas, and discussions were held w1th 
people ranging from a world-famous urban planner, Constanios Doxiodas. who 
was vtstttng Canada, to housewives on the doorsteps of their public 
housing units. 
On January 22nd, 1969 some six months from its starting date, 
Task force released a seventy-page report containing forty-five 
recommendations on ways to provide more housing at a 1ower cost and to 
Improve the development of Canadian cities. Shortly thereafter, Hellyer 
presented to Cabinet a comprehensive legislative program on housing and 
urban development based on the Task Force findings. Three months later 
2 
r~$igned from the government charging that the Cabinet was unwilling 
to action on his proposals, which he considered to be of prime 
Importance to the domestte well-being of the nation. 
This resignation ostensibly brought to a close the short, 
existence of the Task Foree on Housing and Urban Development. 
a study of British Cabinet practices points out. little ts left of 
a men's influence or idees once he has resigned from Cabinet, and the 
Task Force was closely Identified with the personality of Paul He11yer. 2 
It would be a mistake to let the Task Force slip from slght, ending 
up as just another entry in the history books. It was too unusual 
a government enterprise involved in questions too important to this 
nation to have the lessons of its experience lost. 
A look at what the Task Force did and how it worked can reveal 
a good deal about the issues to be faced as we attempt to govern ourselves 
In contemporary urban society. It can te11 us something about how policy 
Is made and who makes It In Ottawa; the changes that are taking place in 
functioning of the executive arm of the federal government; the ways 
In which issues are perceived, 1nformatton gathered. and solutions pre-
scribed and how government relates to the public ln the emergtng age of 
lclpatlon and apparent mass democracy. 
Hora fundamentally, the Task Force experience also ralses the 
question of whether parliamentary government stretched over a federal 
framework, can act as an effective, sensitive agent of social change. There 
ts perhaps no question more important to be asking today. If ·our system 
of government Is not, and cannot be an active, quickly reacting vehicle of 
reform or change, what is the alternative? 
fie 
direct 1n 
Task Force& touched upon an issue more vital than the 
Ions it proposed. Though mention of it never appeared 
Report~ it was Implicitly raising the basic question of 
a deMOcratic system could survive in the k1nd of urban society 
was being created In Canada. In Its exposure of the labyrinth-like 
tem of po11cy making, the deficiencies in research and experimentation~ 
frustration of ordinary citizens deprived of power and responsibility 
to their own affatrs. the Task Foree pointed to a serious weakness 
In capacity of tanadi11ns to cope effectively and democratically with 
the lams posed by the rapid urbanization of our society. 
The purpose.of thls study Is to use the experience of the Task 
Force as a starting point for exaMining at least ln part how well prepared 
1e Canadians ere to create a structure of po1 ley-making relev.ant to 
the demands of our time. 
SETTING - New Government 
First the Task Force on Housing should be placed tn context 
time end events. The fact of e brand new government with a brand new 
Prime Hlnlster, who had some very definite opinions about the way govern-
ment should operate is the starting point of the Task force3• Under lester 
, the tan Cabinet behaved in the fashion of a modified con-
federation of thtnese war lords. There were several strong Cabinet Hlnlsters 
vyed for attent1on and power and competed openly for the 1mp1ementat1on 
'II 
of their own Individual programs 
Admittedly, there was a constant chaotic flavour to the proceed-
ings, but such a system created a ~lstinet identity for ind1vldua1 political 
lfng them to command a hearlng across the country. They 
were 1e to IS$ues, project policies, and act as spokesmen for a 
varl of causes. Walter Gordon 1 s stand on foreign ownership Is perhaps 
Is tendency was emphasized during the liberal 
lp race of 1968. 
Under Trudeau, this was to change. The Cabinet was to become 
a team, a corporate board of directors who worked behind closed doors, 
and who were expected to process Information, consider alternatives in 
rational. ion, engage tn proper long-range planning, and above a11, 
assume a 11 1ow profi1e11 • an expression that was heard frequently on 
liament H111 in those early Trudeau days. Naturally in the first months 
the Trudeau government this change in approach and style was not fully 
llneated. Hany of the holdovers from the Pearson years were st111 
around. and hadn't yet fully absorbed the new modes of operation. The 
new management of a Cabinet Committee system was in a shakedown phase, 
luence of the expanded Privy Council Office and Prime Hinister•s 
Ice was not yet felt. There was. thus, a very different approach to 
governing. 5 Whether the controlled style of Cabinet operation is pre-
1e to the more rambunctious~ (ndividua1istic Cabinet style of the 
years though is an open question. What could be gained by this 
and planning. may be 1ost in the kind of personal leadership and 
ind ldua1 Identification with specific policies, that various Ministers 
such as Walter Gordon and Paul Hellyer and others provided in the Pearson 
government. 
A second pertinent feature of that early Trudeau period was the 
5 
ling of slight exhiiiratlon carrying over from the Centennial and the 
momentum election campaign. There were brave forecasts of new 
worlds to conquer. and a sense of expectation that finally after the 
lon conflict the last Pearson years. serious reconstruction 
In social and economic pollee could take place. Whether sought by him 
or not, Trudeau had i Ired ambitions for a new liberalism that would 
immediate engage the urgent Issues. The Task force on Housing was seen, 
for example. by many both in the public and Inside the political arena. 
as an expression of the expected activism of the new Trudeau government. 
The philosophy of participatory democracy that Trudeau had so 
11y artlcul ing his leadership campaign gave added emphasis 
to expectations that very excitlng, aggressive new actions would be 
Feelings of disillusionment with the Ottawa mandarins, with the 
inery of government, th the conventional style of bureaucratic 
Icy-making had become widespread amongst the younger generation of 
political people, HP 1 s, primarily backbenchers and Executive Assistants. 
was a sense that now was the time for the government to be more 
responsive and dynamic. Trudeau himself spoke of this and indicated 
rough such decisions as setting up a regional desk operation in his own 
Ice that experiments in developing new forms of policy-making ~ere 
1e. 
No one was more prepared to do this than Pau1 He11yer. His 
experience th the admirals during unification had made him wary of the 
es 1ished system of government advisors, and he felt the need particularly 
In field of .housing and urban affairs to go outside the normal channels. 
iculty. again~ was that as in the case of the Cabinet, the meaning 
is new style of participatory democracy was not defined nor any 
6 
and in what ways it could be 
conducted. 
trensltion in style. of expectations of reform, but 
lgulty or Imprecision in the new operating principles and perhaps 
even objectives of gover~nt. The creation of the Task force 
to serious social problems. It had the potential of pioneering 
new, alternative ways to make policy. But there was an uncertainty on 
·just It couid go in working outside the established Ottawa system. 
SETTING - Houslna and titles 
the summer of 1968@ the federal government was under pressure 
to lncreasi 1y troublesome conditions In the related areas 
lng urban development. for most of the period after World War II 
1 housing programmes under the National Housing Act had underwritten 
6 
a successful expansionary housing market. Production generally kept pace 
new demands and the guaranteed mortgage was the magic Ingredient 
gave the middle class their suburban home. There had been little 
in field of low income houslng. but Canadians were too busy 
lng the post war boom to be much worried about deteriorating Inner 
cities~ urban ugliness. or the plight of the disadvantaged. 
h situation began to change in the mid-1960's. Tight money 
11. the same time the surge of post war babies reached the age where 
wanted their own 
accOMMOdation. The Increasingly higher costs of housing and the rising 
7 
even middle income families& especially in 
were runnl short 
were unable to purchase homes. 7 The MUnicipalities 
as they were forced to keep up to the demand for 
ng awareness of the urban environment, 
by Canadians observing the difficulties of American 
cit to the ng climate of concern and criticism. 
government was 111-prepared to meet these new 
In the autumn 1967® the Pearson government forestalled a 
debate in the of Commons by promising a federa1-provinc1a1 
on Housing. conference was held in December of 1967 and 
was a disaster. The proposals presented by the federal government were 
scorned provinces as being meaningless, and the provincial Premiers 
early deciding if the sum tota1 of the federal govern-
ng about the problem was to set up a Council on Urban Affairs, 
would better spend thefr time at home. The conference revealed 
sting programmes were not sufficient to meet the current 
ing prob1~ms~ and that the supply of new ideas for coptng with 
conditions in the ci was sadly dep1eted. 8 
ll tt 1e was done the Pearson government in the ensuing months. 
to the tota1 preoccupation th liberal leadership po1ltics. Several 
Iring candidatese however, made major speeches on the Issue of 
ing and urban affairs, particularly Paul Hellyer who introduced his 
concept of new cities for tanada.9 
In the June 1968 e~ection campaign. Prtme Minister Trudeau 
his norMal practice of speaking in general terms about unity and the 
t Society to deliver a specific address to the annual convention of 
lan Federation of Mayors and Municipalities in Edmonton on June 4th 
8 
it bore the mark of his thinking. In the speech, 
uncharacteristic made specific pledges. He promised to set 
Development and thus acknowledged 
serious problems ext~ted in the field of housing and urban develop-
mont. 
In a basic sense 9 this emergence in the mid-1960 1 5 of 
concern over housing cities represented a new generation of social 
hsues. 
we1 
were Issues that didn 1 t fit the traditional categories of 
lth or social services which had been the s~ck In trade of 
lcies In The political parties and leaders had 
loped certain philosophical approaches and operational responses to· 
Issues of a ~~~ But now, a new set of Issues growing 
more subt1eD complex 
cou1 1 t be handled 
diffuse in nature, calling for responses that 
traditional means. Governments of a11 levels had 
11 with urban problems for a long time. But never In the context 
all its attendant problems. Canadian cltles 
were not on expanding very quickly. they were becoming qualitatively 
di t In the style life they imposed. The system of government 
respon~kb1e for the cities was engu~fed by the whole range of demands 
growth. movement and change that was taking place in the 
patchwork of rules and regu1atlons 9 divided jurisdictions, 
Inter-governmental arrangements. and long-standing financial aids were 
not capable of managing the cities in an effective way. 10 The failure 
was one structure - it was just too ill-organized. It was one of thought -
conventional theories just didn 1 t work. And. it was one of 1eadershlp -
housing 
preparing 
ing 
to take responstbi1ity. 
federal government officta1s responsible 
policy didn't see the storm coming sooner and begin 
it. One reason was that on the Cabinet level the field 
lopment, had been virtually non-exlstent. It was 
i~~ job, passed great frequency to a variety of Hintsters 
carried other portfo11os 9 and usually treated the task with 
irritation 1t was dealt that a11. Therefore, no Hinlster really 
lch he would invest much of his time, nor political 
tes. In fact, one could that in general there were very few 
ltica1 e In government concerned with the Issue. The dts-
ing of 1ege1 work on CHHC mortgeges was an attractive patronage p1um 9 
beyond that9 federal Cabinets made little effort to establish cogent 
policies for hou~ing urban development. 
As a result, Central Mortgage and Housing Corporation was 1eft 
vi 1y alone without too much prodding from the politicians. CHHC 
over the years. had oped en icient organization for servicing 
programmes that had been Introduced over the years. those previously 
lng to guarantee mortgages, give grants and loans for urban renewal, 
lie housing, sewage treatment and research. As Is true with all well-
running organlzations 9 it was quite satisfied with the smooth functioning 
Its operation and dldn 1 t engage, as few organizations do, tn continuing 
self-appraisal and review. Neither was there really any other source of 
outsl lsa1 or generator of new ideas with sufficient expertise or 
t ion to challenge or question its performance. The provincial 
lng corporations were all •uite new and tended in any event to be staffed 
old ex-CHHC men shered many views in common with their former 
10 
cont 
if they did differ, they were not apt to be too 
lie to the organfzation that paid for most of their 
we11 there were very few urban experts or urban centres 
In un It certafin1y did not provide much critical 
c~nt. Ottawa-based lobby and pressure group organizations which 
en Interest In urban matters such as the Canada We1fare Council? 
lon of Mayors were also c1ose1y linked to CHHC and the ruling 
structure of the federal gover~nt, and contented themseives with making 
an annual plea for more money or more public housing, goals also shared 
So, In effect 9 there was a close system of policy-making, 
popu1 by a small number of men who over the years had become well 
nted with one another and wfth each other's vfews. Alternatives to 
Is tightly linked network of icy-making might have been provided 
political people In Ott~a& but they had little interest and 11tt1e 
concern In the tssuei. 
slowness of government to respond to all the danger signals 
t f1 ing from urban areas in this period high1ights the 
tion of government 1 s capaci 
there. Is a v f rtua 1 monopo 
to be a successful Instrument of change. 
information and ski11 exercized by 
, and when there are no Independent or competing sources of 
or policy, then it leads Invariably to a situation where response 
reaction to change Is too s1ow to be usefui, Jf it happens at ali. 
THE FEDERAl FACT 
An additional factor in assessing the work of the Task Force is 
dl JeuJtles of making policy in a federal system. The emergence of 
Issues related to urbanization and housing occurred just at a very 
critical point in the continuing Canadian struggle between federal govern-
lncese and at a sensitive point in the relations between 
and 1 i speaking Canada. National Unity was the first priority 
new government 0 and constitutional change its Preoccupation. 
issue was measured In terms of its bearing on the delicate 
iatlons and relationships in re-ordering unity, and restructuring 
ion. 
The problems associated with housing and urban development, 
involving as they do major questions of inter-governmental reWatlonshlps 
ran cross-current with the Trudeau government's desire to work out proper 
les of respective provincial and federal responsibilities. Trudeauw 
a federalist, did not believe in an aggressive. activist role for 
federal government and felt that the federal government had a minimal 
ro1• In the cities. il He, and other Ministers from Quebec, were therefore, 
not going to •ncourege new federal policy initiatives in housing, especially 
It would be bound to upset the provinces and make negotiations more 
di h:uh, 
A basic fact of Canadian government thus is reaffirmed. Efforts 
at social change through government policy must take second place to the 
irements of keeping the federal system together. Several extra sets 
les, ail the more difficult to jump In these days of active 
I ncl 1 ism provincial premiers 9 and the prtck1y nationalist feelings 
Quebec are &n the way of every proposal for change. New socfa1 po1icy 
must therefore also have a built-in strategy for coping with our peculiar 
fact. Programmes and responses to issues cannot be judged simply 
on best answer, but what is also capable of being accepted by 
a11 different. governments. As the recent memoirs of General Eisenhower 
12 
less time on strategies to n the war. than strategies 
to allies together. Obviously, there must-be a balance between 
lrement to keep up with change and the requirement to hold to-
di iculty is in determining where the balance iles and what 
criteria is for judging when too much emphasis is placed on one or 
Is it that would properly assess whether 
It h more o1 r I to an acute shortage of housing or to raise the 
Ire provincial governments. This was the kind of issue raised by the 
one is sti11 unresolved. 
REASONS FO~ A TASK FORtE 
ment 
outs i 
concept of a Task Force is borrowed from the military. It 
ization designed to achieve a very specific goal, 
12 ing outside the normal adminTstrative structures. 
first received currency In the beginnings of the Kennedy administration 
ous 
was suspicious of the policy output of the career civil 
relatively quick answers to pressing problems. 13 
For similar reasons of dissatisfaction wJth.the po!ley process 
Canadian Cabinet Ministers also began using the tns~ru-
to new policies. In the Pearson government, 
1icized Task Force on Foreign Ownership 
her Gordon, and a quiet, 1itt1e knOW'n Task Force set up 
rner while Registrar-General to re-vamp the Corporations Act. These 
tons had a common working method of pulling together a group of 
who were to develop new policy or programme proposals in 
short defined period of t They differed in that the Foreign 
lp Fore~ led by He1vl11e Watkins was very noisy and pub1ic, 
ion Act Task Force received only passing mention in the 
foreign Ownership Report became a public document. 
ion Task force reserved its findings for the Minister. 
The guidelines for setting up the early task forces. or for 
should operate were never properly defined, relying 
lca11y on the preferences of the individual Minister. They were an 
to 
to fi1~ a need in the system of policy-making. They were 
inging In special outside experts of particular competence 
alternative ideas to those received from the cfvi1 service. 
Increasing skepticism and suspicion that existed between 
po1iticlan and civil servant or the Inadequacy of the government service 
to skills necessary to solve an increasingly complex 
Task Forces were seen a1so to be a quicker, 
Commissions, and more public1y acceptable, 
I cu 1 ar ·in 1 i ght of the react ton to the time and expense incurred by 
BI-H Bi-cuhuraUsm Commission. 14 As we11, they were viewed 
as a more Instrument of the Cabinet Hinister, a body of his own 
ing his staff could have immediate access, and not have 
through 
11tt1e relation .to 
rituals prescribed by Deputy Ministers. They also had 
!lament or its members. They were then very much an 
at by certain Cabinet Hembers to get out from under the clvl1 service, 
wl getting back into Parliament. The Task Forces might thus be 
as direct out-growths of the efforts of certain of the political 
executives to exercise a po1icy·making and leadership function in an 
dua1 way 
on • short term 
ng into government outside talent responsible to 
is, to solve problems that government personnel 
did not 11 capacity to meet. 
15 
::vcuernm,~nt to review a host of matters ranging from unemployment 
ifisurance we~fare policy to the post office and amateur sportso 
!'!'lOSt 
I'H11hter 
lnent ~ublieized of them a11 was the one set up under 
Tran~port Paul T. 1yer. 
Inspiration for the Task Force came from He11yer and he 
was h~s guiding hand. Paul Hellyer had for many years a vita1 interest 
In area of hou~lng and urban affairso as we11 as an understanding of 
eeto unusual for someone in politics. Although his public fame 
primarily won as the Minister of Defence who had piloted through 
unification, hh interest in urban matters went back to the .time when he 
political ]ife th the ambition of doing something about housing. 
a developer in Toronto& he had gathered both experience with the practical 
1ems of developing cities and strong views on the failures and foibles 
various government programmes. 
the new government, he achieved wh~t he had long sou9ht -
lbili for hou,ing and urban policy. A.fter the 1968 election! 
was given.minlsterial responsibility for Central Mortgage and Hous&ng 
lon, In addition to this Transport portfolio, and he received 
t from the Prime Minister to launch a Task Force. He proceeded 
to establish in his own offlce a separate organization to assist in 
admlnlstr~tlon of housing and urban affairs programs and used the 
to assemble 11 s and make plans for the Task Force which 
to begin activity In the fa11. 
CONDUCT AND OPERATION 
11yer several important decisions on the for~t and con-
of Foree. There were the critical determinants in shaping the 
16 Task Force operation. 
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fint was the demand for speed. Hellyer believed that 
serious were occuring In the Canadian housing market and 
extei'IS 1ve leg h lathe act ion would have to be taken by the 
the 1969 construction season to correct the flaws. 
lcularly pressing was the need for financial measures that wou1d 
direct sufficient funds Into housing to meet the projected annua1 demand 
some .000 units. The schedule was therefore to be a tight one. 
Forc11 !Bfl)Uld compiete IU work inside of six months 9 giving t1'1111 
tIme to 1 eg h 11lte the desired changes by the Sprt ng. 
Task Force was designed therefore to be an instrument dell1-
lng th lln late problem. as we11 as to design a longer range program. 
Is pressure of time meant that very 11tt1e in the way of basic research 
could 
would be 
were 
t lag. 
movlngo 
commissioned. It was feh that available resources and research 
Ice to give a basic analysis of the situation and that the 
need not provide answers to a11 problems, only point out those 
ier review. There was an obvious risk in such an 
Critics wouid have the opportunity to latch on to those problems 
17 unanswered~ and obviously some factors would be overlooked. 
lanced against the merit of developing policy and programmes 
leal. A serious failure of present government practices is 
the time officials perceive an issue. get the poltcy machinery 
lement a progr~ 0 chances are the issue has gone through 
several new phases and the ~rogramme doesn°t fit. A Task Force that seeks 
to relevant can at least match its formulations to existing problems -
fng to ia1 in its recommendations than to be badly out of date. 
LIBRARY 
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A Force operation working to meet immediate tssues can 
ive If there h existing a body of app1 ied research to draw 
18 Then 9 Wt is simply a matter of sifting through evidence and 
been found. Unfortunately. In the case of the Housing 
state of urban research, particularly policy research was 
dhma1. it came to asking the universities and their thinkers for 
answers what came back was opinion, conventional wisdom based on what 
leans or Swedes were doing. or requests for new research grants -
1ftt1e in the way of recommendations for new actions based on hard 
anal is of Canadian conditions. Thus. the one important fact, relating 
to cap~tty of government to form policy to match events is how much 
a pool of knowledge there is to draw upon. How much there is to draw 
Is ~lrect1y dependent on how much has been previously Invested in 
1em solving research. The capacity of the Housing Task Force to 
lop comprehens1ve solutions was impaired by the lack of this kind of 
edge and the shortage of basic data relating to urbanization, the 
ing market and other serious conditions in the cities. 
Even with these limitations. the Task Force succeeded In covering 
most of the ground, and 1istening to a good many of the experts. The 
fstlcs of canvassing an entire country was complicated. but the Task 
250 oral presentations. attend a number of public meetings, and hold dis-
cussions th a number of government officia1s. 19 The three and one-half 
tour gave tVme for numerous discussions and arguments among· . Task 
so that by the the end of the schedule a systhesis of approach 
took place. And, true to his intention, Hr. Hellyer had a report 
In six months. and recommendi!llltions to the government shortly following. 
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A second critical decision was the organization of the Task 
membership of the Ta!k Force and its terms of reference were 
on Hellyer conceived as a form of jury operation. Members 
Force were chosen In good Canadian fashion on the bash of 
on the different skills in various disciplines they could 
brl very carefu11y avoided selecting individuals who were 
edged as 01whe men11 in the field. The idea was to br1ng together 
a of people who were .not Identified with existing po1tcies 9 who 
not fought batt1es to introduce public housing or urban renewal, or 
senior membership In the network of groups and associations that had 
po1icy inf1uentla1s on housing matters over the 
if there was to be real reform, and just not a 
the ~~ answers that had been offered over the years. a 
more ectlve group was requi They could sft back and ask hard questions 
Ung icu!arly eoftmitted to any existing scheme. Thh did 
not mean that Task Force members were without views, nor was Hellyer 
himself. It simply meant that being outside the network~ members of the 
Force ght evaluate what had been produced by the existing system 
. 20 
effect he 1y. 
as this might have been from a policy-making point of 
view, it created difficulties from a polittea1 point of view. There Is no 
question that fraternity of policy inf1uentla1s felt snubbed. None 
members were on the Task Foree. so how could there be 
idenee in tts findings. As well. aside from one offiela1 from CHHC who 
as liaison and took little pert in the proceedings, there was 1itt1e 
19 
lr~et l'~rtleipation from the Corporation. They prepared research 
pi cion 
were very efficient and useful in helping to organize the 
tour. But. they had little direct Input. So. there was real 
ion between the Task Force and those individuals who had long 
over housing and urban policy. This caused resentment and sus-
those excluded, and their response to the Task Force was framed 
feeUngs. 21 
Another group of interests not represented on the Task Force 
were provincial or municipal governments. The Task Force appeared to 
these other governments as a totally federal approach. dealing 
wl a subject that crossed jur&sdictiona1 lines. During the course of 
Force hearings. conversations were held with provincial ministers 
responsible for housing, th many mayors and 1ocai government officials. 
In 
legit 
lefs were received from most cities. These were quite sufficient 
ing the arguments of the other levels of government. The Task 
was looked upon as a federal show and thereby 1ost some of its 
It also ga~e some provinces the chance to disassociate them-
selves from the findings. as they could claim no involvement with the 
1 iberat of the Task force. 
This points to another set of dtfficulttes for pol icy-making 
Ol"i ':JCJda1 issues. Because most of the contemporary issues cannot be dlvtded 
1nto neat compartments. respectively assigned to each 1eve1 of governments 
mechanism Is available and most suitable for generating new policy 
lations. The approach of the Housing Task Force was to use the 
approach. One government sets forth a set of propositions which 
levels of government can then respond to and Issue their own alter-
natives. is the approach of the Constitutional conferences where 
20 
· ''l1ifl!l h "~ attempt at joint discussion and formulation at the official 
by the advocacy proceeding in formal constitutional 
approach of having truly combined po1icy-
1em tn ts approach Is how to select what representative, and whether 
would act as spokesmen for their respective governments, or 
In a collective enterprise of investigation. The other approach 
is constitutional one which seeks to remake the constitution to 
ell nate Inter-jurisdictional responsibilities. This is unrealistic. 
approach used by the Task Force was probably the best one 
the circumstances. The problems inherent, and the time 
in !ng out e Task Force that would have involved a1i levels of 
set back the actua1 undertaking to a point where 
fl ings wouid have been irrelevant. The Task force on 
9 along ali the other things It was attempting to accomplish. 
Inter-governmental mechanism. that had been addressing itself to the 
1ems of jurl~dictlon. constitutionalism and federal-provfncial-
22 
municipal relationships In the ffeld of housing and urban affairs. A 
h orl to es 11sh such a body was one of the few outcomes of the 1967 
could 
1-provlnclel housing conference. but it was not functioning at the 
Task Force. Therefore, aside from one paper commissioned to 
1-provlncl~l implications of its findings, the Task Force 
little reference to the eompilcated question of how its findings 
~~plemanted Inside the constitutional federa1 framework. This 
a source of many problems when it came to the Federal Cabinet 1 s 
dhcuulon the Report. 
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&E.' MINISTERIAl POWER 
the 
In setting down operating guidelines. the Minister of Transport 
right from the start on the basis that he would be the chair-
Force, be present at its hearings and de1iberations9 and 
quite naturally exercheda strong influence on the findings. Thh was a 
ic<E~1 departure from normal practice. The tradith:>n. whether whh Task 
Forces. Royal Commissions. and even In the bureaucratic policy process. is 
the Cabinet Minister to stay aloof. or at least separated from the 
lng body. 23 
The reasons are obvious. A policy initiation body can come 
th with recommendations that may be unacceptable to the Cabinet. The 
Minister to whom Task Force or Commission or whatever reports. simply 
passes the report on to Cabinet. The Government is thus in no way committed 
to findings, except to study them. nor is the individual Cabinet Minister. 
He personally be In favour and argue so in the confines of the Cabinet 
room. But, pub1ica11y he is disassociated, and if Cabinet does not 
the recommendations, he Is not forced to resign. Even in the case 
Task Force on Foreign Ownership where Waiter Gordon was clearly 
~ssociated with the issue and where he undoubtedly exercised an informal 
1uence on Its deliberations, he dtd not become an official part of the 
A11 is is done in the name of Cabinet solidarity. that sacred 
principle bequeathed to us from eighteenth century British practice. No 
Minister can be at odds with his fellows, as the government must stand 
united. 
Interestingly enough, at the outset of the Task Force, there 
little questioning of He11yer•s participation by other 
1- ~-- .. ~····· .. ~····- ... ,T'-·--
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government. Hellyer himself be11eved that he had been 
It as recommendations for government action. Yet he was in effect 
creating something of a brand new instrument of policy-making. one that 
went beyond the conventlonal functions assigned to Royal Commissions or 
2~ Task Forces. It was not a body separated from government. not a 
semi-Independent investigatory body from whlch government could divorce 
itself. It was a grafting on.to the executive arm a personal ministerial 
icy-making body ~ an extension of the office of the Cabinet M1n1ster 
was not civil service. It endowed the Minister with a new set of 
~rs of hwestigations. public accesslbi1ity, and intellectual skilL 
lt. in effect, changed the role of the Cabinet Minister in several important 
ways. It gave him new resources for competing with the expertise of the 
dened his powers as a policy initiator and thrust him 
Into the position of pub1ic advocate for change and reform. 
This transubstantiation of the Task Force into a new kind of 
policy-making body had very visible results. When the Task Force came 
to town. it was not headed by some little known university president, 
J or inessman. It was headed by the Minister. It was a body with 
not just to recommend, but because of the involvement of the Cabinet 
Minister. presumably to act. This made a great difference to the proceedings. 
The presence of Paul Hellyer on the Task Force gave it an impact and 
visibility it otherwise wou1d not have had. When people appeared before 
it were speaking directly to the man who would introduce new legislation. 
extensive publicity that accompanied the Task Force was not a result 
1lx months. 
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~eriousness of the issue, but also because the chairman 
lnet Minister who was pledging concrete results within 
expectations that were thereby created may have been tn 
believed in low profile politics. but they did 
this form of policy-making can stir a response, and make 
t believable to the public. It is something they can see, readily 
accessible. It Is putting the power of the office of Minister closer to 
chhen - c_1ose enough that he believes he can directly Influence 
t it does. 25 
Thh transformation of the Task force concept was never 
llrticu1ated at that time- nehher the press. the publtc or other members 
government fully grasped the significance during the fall months 
as It criss-crossed the country. Only when the Task force Report was 
for release In January of 1969. was there a reaction. Because the 
t Itself challenged several accepted ideas, and was not just going 
to a repetition of existing policles. did the Implications of the Task 
become clear. Here was a controversial Report 9 being made pub1ic 9 
the signature of the responsible minister affixed. Efforts were 
members of the government to alter the timtng and form of presentation, 
it was too late. The Report was released and soon thereafter, Hellyer 
presented to the government a new housing programme based on the Task force. 
as promised he would do six months previous when the Task Force began. 
Obviously, thus use of a Task Force by a Minister ran against 
cus Cabinet practice. The system is not built for that kind of 
extension of ministerial power. and It was bound to cause prob1ems9 
icularly the feeling that Hellyer had usurped the power of Cabinet to 
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ley. This might have been looked upon.as an aberration. ·and 
over if i~ 1 t been for the fact that the Report pushed a strong 
actlvht role the federa.1 government and ran counter to the attitudes 
lnet Hlnhters on matters of federal-provincial relations. 
11yer had a sense of urgency and pushed for immediate 
ton and quick dispatch of his recommendations. These factors 
combined to make a real Issue of the nature and style of the Task Force, 
to set up strong opposition to He11yer 1 s programme • 
. The longer range tmp1lcat1ons of this Task Force cha11enge to 
lstlng Cabinet system are Important. There is increasing discussion 
ies of the present system of Cabinet Parliamentary govern-
mant. There are changes by the opposition that Trudeau is creating a 
pres1denti•1 ~ystem. There are complaints from Members of P•r1iament 
11tt1e i 1uence. There is continuous criticism of the 
lon of the civil service. And. there are even mutterings from 
Hinisteri~1 offices that the pre~ent team concept Is inhibitfing. 26 
The Hellyer Task Force was one response to these various com-
p1alnts about the machinery of government. Even with a11 its Imperfections. 
it was one way of giving much more of a role to the responsible elected 
pol Hlca1 Jeader. It was a way of developing alternative poHcies. from 
d"'l~ service. It was a way of providing some counter-weight 
to_ growing power of the Prime Minister. _It was a way of ut11h:ing the 
position of Cabinet Hlnlster to give Issue leadership and provide direct 
contact to the public. lt. thus raised certain critical questions of how 
we11 the present system operates and whether or not the new generation of 
issues demands new methods of executive action. 
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This ·does not mean that a totally disorganized system Is the 
answ~r - nothing would be gained by having Cabinet Ministers constantly 
ng countryside promoting a random selection of unrelated programmes. 
it does suggest that perhaps adaptations can be built into the system 
to t, with the prior cognizance of Cabinet, certain Ministerial 
Forces to operate in a pub11c fashion In those issue areas where such 
ism would be justified. The resulting recommendations should 
responsibility of the Minister, but he needn't resign if his full 
ramme ts not accepted. it would be an acknowledgement of the Govern-
ment that some ktnds of problems, especially in the stage when they first 
• need the kind of direct1on a Ministerial Task Force would provide. 
question Is whether it 1s worth the effort to develop an instrument 
government that can contend with immediate problems with some dispatch, 
and with a more open form of contact with the public, rather than continue 
in present, more rigid framework. 
PARTICIPATORY POLICY-MAKING 
Perhaps the judgment on that question depends on the evaluation 
Force as a vehicle of participatory poltcy-mak1ng. Though 
decision to personally head the Task Force might have been the most 
significant from the political and governmental point of view, the decision 
1yer to take the Task Force directly to the people might have been 
the most progressive departure. 
There is a growing disillusionment in Canada with the way 
lslons are made. There Is a lack of trust in government, a sterility 
In debate of the experts. and a distinct feeling that too many 
Student unrest~ 
hh 
stri • citizens 1 movements. are the familiar signs. The Idea 
Is not working we11 tn Canada, especially urban Canada is 
9 and there are of course a11 kinds of explanations based 
ies of alienation. anonomie. mass societ~ to explain why. 27 That 
lve chambers and bureaucratic structures aren 1 t coping wfth 
is feeling ts another fact. Perhaps the most exciting aspect of the 
phenomenon in 1968, especially to the young, and the urban middle 
elan was h h s I neerl ty 1 n cal Hng for a new form of partIcipatory 
The Task Foree on Housing had as one of Its guiding principles, 
it would tilik to the people. The philosophy was expressed lby 
el zens 
in a speech to the Canadian Real Estate Board during the early 
Foree. He sa1d: 
11 1n our Task Foree, we are having a look at the country 
as It really fs. Hembers of the Task Force are having 
to what few Canadians are ever forced to do. They 
are being taken out of their normal routine wor1ds of 
tEUiCherp businessman, ,,o1 iticlan and are having to dis-
cover a new world. We are by necessity, day by day. being 
compelled to shake off our long standing notions and · 
basic preJudWces. Through our meetings~ our walks in 
the streets, our tours of apartments. senior citizen 
homes, and public housing we are being exposed to the 
inner world of urban Canada • 
•••. We are finding out from people themselves what they 
Ink, talking to them ln their own neighbourhoods. This 
h not a Task Force that wiH make up its mind only through 
written evidence or expert testimony. We are also absor·b-
fng the character of Canadians as they seek to flnd a 
decent life In a very complicated urban wor1d. 11 28 
meant what he said. It began with a public meeting in a 
middle class housing development in Ottawa, where over 300 
Task Force members engaged tn a tough four-hour question 
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time in each community talking and listening to 
a great r~nge of citizens. There was the standard procedure 
a11 commissions and task forces- to properly entertain briefs from 
of groups and experts. But, In addition~ there were the multi-
lngs in public housing projects, walking tours of urban 
lunches with citizens groups. It is difficult to measure the number 
ie were approached, and who offered their views. There were 
lc episodes - a teenage girl in Regents Park who described her 
1es 11vlng 1n pub~lc housings a 6:00a.m. visit with fishermen In 
, a tour through some of the bad housing occupied by Indian 
Is In downtown nnlpegs the angry outbursts of housewives In 
In Vancouver who wanted to plan their own urban renewal. 
ls no question that this experience had a strong tnfluence 
Force. Time and agaVn It became clear that there was a dis-
slon-mllkers. The sociologists would say that what w.is needed w11s 
Uc lng. the people who 1lved in it disagreed. City officials 
eloquent over the success of urban renewal, people to1d a different I 
I ~ ~cs said there was not really a housing crisis. people told 
ir frustration of not finding a good place to live at a price they 
I 
~ 
I 
I 
to be very skeptical of the advice and Information 
given experts and officle1s. 29 I 
I, 
was also a reciprocal effect on citizens. for the 
first t mG for many. they were being asked what they thought. They were 
ing, an Invitation to express what they felt to the man who 
could decide. Legitimacy was given to various citizens groups. as Hellyer 
t what they had to say and gave his support to their efforts. One 
that the phenomenon of citizens movements across Canada, 
was given substantial push by the Hellyer Task Force. Some critics 
labelled Task Force a trave111ng circus -perhaps correctly when you 
consider that circuses attract the attention of a lot of people and get 
Involved. 
This was a very hea1thy happening. It helped the Task Force 
cone 1 us tons that i.t wou 1 d never have reached if it had been sat ts ft ed 
to p1ay the conventional game of public hearings. pressure group briefs, 
lclal briefings. It created a vehicle for pub1fc participation 
In icy-making. it was transitory -a one-shot effort, but it tapped 
a we11 spring of opinion. wisdom and experience that rarely penetrates the 
c¥ system of decision-making that is endemic with modern government. 
It provided a model for succ6eding ventures in participatory policy-
making, making hshionab1e. maybe even necessary efforts to go beyond the 
drde of those with influence or· organizational power to talk to the 
kinds of average citizens. The sty1e, approach and method of involving 
le was one of the most important aspects of the Task Force and one of I, 
ts or commendations as a new po1icy device. \ 
IT ION 
The Task Force, when it fina1Jy reported, was faced with serious 
opposition. Some C~binet Ministers resented the manner of presentation 
9 and felt th~t they were being pressured into accepting 
rec~endlatio<iS because Hellyer had a1ready pub1ic1y staked hts position 
on ir being approved. The rationale for opposing the recommendations 
~ere couched In terms of concern over the activist federal role espoused 
over_fears that it would disrupt existing programmes in 
public housing. There might a1so have been elements of 
personal reaction against He11yer 9 especia11y from newer Ministers who 
reacted to the image of Hellyer as the tough, uncompromising Minister of 
unification days. 
This opposition was supported and indeed abetted by members of 
o1d "housing 11 fraternity -both within and without the civi1 service. 
were several senior civi1 servants who had no 11klng for the Minister 
Transport. He had often expressed his opposition to the rule of the 
i~eaucracy and had fought them in the unification debate. There were 
in the government service who had been responsible for some of the 
P rams that the Report attacked, and they added their voices to the 
inside network of opposition.3° 
They were joined by spokesmen for various Ottawa-based pressure 
groups or volunteer organizations that professed interest in the "sochll1 11 
aspects of housing. _Their opposition was by far the most irresponsible --
often ;scor~truing the recommendations and intent of the Report. RepeatedVy 
the charge was hurled that Hel1yer and the Task Force were against low-Income 
housing. making one wonder whether many of these professionai reformers 
had bothered to read the Report before they made their criticisms. In fact, 
Report was critical of public housing as a means of providing Dow-Income 
housing and recommended changing public housing programmes. But it also 
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Introducing e number of other alternative programmes to 
alleviate ."'cblem of low-cost houslng. 31 The opposition of this group 
lvate groups who are supposed to be dedicated to social progress 
from 11c criticism to private memoranda to members of the 
displayed an extreme conservatism in their attitudes 
changing the system and can be awarded points equal to the most 
obdurate business or trade group in a defense of a status quo that they 
he1 to create. 
The other major source of opposition came from certain pro-
vinciai governments. The Report had raised serious questions about hhe 
ings the urban renewal, public housing system. partlcular1y the 
practice whereby the national government paid for the programmes and the 
ineia1 governments took the credit. 32 There was also an attitude 
1ent amongst some provincial houstng officials, that accomplishments 
housing Held could be measured simply by the gross number of units 
w~re built with federal funds regardless of how well they fitted the 
people. A dosed federal-provincial conference of housing Ministers 
was ld in Toronto in late february and representatives of the larger 
provinces displayed their opposition to any change in the ro1e of the 
ra1 government. Through the circuit of federal-provincial secretariats 
al"lc.; I nforma 1 11 nks, these fears found the ears of those l n Ottawa who 
were icu1arly sensitive to the concerns of the provinces. 
Each of these kinds of oppositions were not to be unexpected 
cor.~idering the way the Task Foree contravened established working relation-
ips. They rea11y can't be changed without friction and opposition. 
reaction in Cabinet& the opposition of civil service, the antagonism 
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1uenti~1 iv~te groups in the network of housing po1icy-makers 9 the 
'~ement provincial govern~~ents represent the sources of reaction 
at change. This Is not to imply that a11 the criticisms 
w~re tota11y wrong 9 and a11 the actions of the Task Force and Paul He11yer 
it doe~ reveal the pressure points in the policy-making 
suggests that any attempts at social change had better en-
s u·ateg i es to cope w i th the attitudes and opinions he 1 d by those 
occupy the critical positions In the system. That is why lt is 
to consider ways in which political leaders can mobilize publtc 
and create public demand, as it is one counter ~eight to the 
1ished holders of power. 33 That was one advantage held by the Task 
Strong support came from many areas. Many members of the govern-
ment caucus applauded the Task Force 9 particularly those from big cities 
where the problems were critica1 9 the abuses most pronounced, and where the 
Force had communicated the government 1 s concern. There was general 
from the media, and from many individuals who had been crying in 
wilderness over the years in the i.r opposition to urban renewa I and public 
lng, The most telling sign was the favourable reaction by the public, 
I a 11y the pressed and the low income. from the representations 
and letters received by Hellyer, it was clear that a chord of response had 
struck th the many Canadians who were suffering most for lack of good 
ng <H'Id good urban po 1 i ci es. Perhaps the weakness was that such support 
was not given time to germinate. 
In ml 
The array of forces designed to hold up the introduction of new 
programmes won out. Hellyer introduced his program in early February. 
11. It was still being shuttled from one Cabinet Committee to 
Hellyer resigned on April 22. 
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SUCCESSES 
resignation did not mean that the work of the Task Foree 
llure ~quite the contrary. In the first Instance, Hel1yer 1 t 
11ed government into action and by June of 1969 
was passed by Parliament that Incorporated many of 
lo~r~s of the Task force.3 4 Many of the other findings of 
are st111 being acted upon by the government. Robert Andras, 
the 11=tlme job of overseeing housing (an improvement in itself) 
eonti the stoppage of urban renewal until more effective programmes 
are deveioped. He has also offered $200 million for proposals to better 
1ow-tneome housing, and began some changes In public housing po11ey. 
also commissioned a major study of urbanization which could gather 
More lmportant 9 He11yer and the Task Foree did spark beginnings 
aetlvi t could bring about even more significant changes in the 
housing and urban development. The Task Force evaluated the 
_i$sues, ga~e them visibility, created an awareness in the public that 
ing was wrong. They helped activate many concerned groups and 
ividuals to begin thinking seriously about the problems, and probing for 
The Task Foree findings challenged and discredited many 
~onventlonal wisdoms, and exposed the weaknesses in major programmes such 
urban renewa 1 9 1 and assemb 1 y and pub 1 i c housing. .They demonstrated the 
to find ~re effective answers. The Task Force also gave rise to new 
itica1 processes centered on urban issues. The recent activity and 
uenee of the citizens groups can be partly attributed to the credence 
lven such movements In the Report and in Hellyer's actions in supporting 
i r Reform movements In 1oca1 government were given ammunition 
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Housing and urban development have become major planks 
1eid 1 s opposition to Hr. Trudeau. And, even in Hr. Trudeau•s 
own caucus, there are.urban based HP 1s who take open issue with the 
1 government1slack of radical action. These happenings, cannot be 
~~cr bad directly to the Task Force. But the Task Force unlocked the door 
set many of these forces loose and in so doing partially fulfilled tts 
ambition to bring about change& even though its Report and the Htnister 
sponsored it were turned down by the government. To use the old adage -
first one to breach the barricade is bound to fall. But his efforts 
make It possible for others to follow. 
MACHINERY FOR CHANGE 
Asl from whatever effects the Task Force might have had tn 
ng new approaches to the problems of houstng and urban affairs, its 
ience raises the more basic question of how prepared is the govern-
ment in to be an active Innovator - an agent for socta1 change. The 
was an instrument of policy-making different from what govern-
ment tried up to then. It ran contrary to the model of rational, 
administrative decision-making betng applied by the Trudeau government. It 
provided a proto-type of how the power for policy-initiation of individual 
lt1ca1 leaders can be enhanced and how an alternative mechan1sm to the 
clvVI service. or the closed inter-acting systems of bureaucracy and prtvate 
pressure groups can be effectively devised. It also provided one way of 
giving meaning to the fdea of participatory democracy. 
In doing this it ran counter to some sacred precepts of the 
lnet system of government. It jarred the conservative tendencies of 
many Canadian decision-makers. both po1itica1 and public servant, who 
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government should not inttlate expectations~ but slmp1y 
serve as a broker between competing Interests. It 
difficulties Inherent in our federal system fn bringtng 
of socia1 changee Canadians suffer under a multiplication 
lcu1t process of itself, and this can be a 
growing frustration In an era of new types of social and economic 
lssues 9 unless it is brought to an end. 
governmental Institutions to deal whh the problems of 
lng a MOdern society are urgent1y needed, and thls is where the 
lenons of the Task Force are important. The Task Force was not a per-
mechanism, nor was it designed to be an tdea1 instrument of po1icy-
ng. 9 ·lts experience sh~ that there are ways government can remodel 
f to be open and activist, less bureaucratic, with more participation 
less dom3nance by experts. It has shown that perhaps more 
1d be given to political leaders to provide issue 1e~dership, 
the Cabinet system be re·fitted to suit a greater freedom for 
lnet Mlnisters. 35 It gives encouragement to those who believe that 
sti11 might provide a relevant democratic means of ll_'iaking 
lslons even on complicated issues. 
These are lmportan_t InsIghts to have. The issue of how govern-
mu&t ght fi 11 e role of Initiation. be C!l. vehicle for 1eghimate1y 
expressing today's mood of discontent and be one major source 
is a critical poittlcai question. The success or failure of the 
Force thus cannot be presently measured. It depends on whether the 
the lessons it provided through its experience can be added to other 
lessons to help form a new theory of how governmen~ in Canada can act as 
an of change - keeping step with the pace of events. A look at the 
I : 
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can 1 t give the entire picture of what Is needed 9 but It 
a good st<~rt. 
,, I 
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FOOTNOTES 
In a letter of transmittal from Paul T. Hellyer to 
1-; ®f?~ E. Trudeau as recorded 1 n the Task Force Report: Report 
Task force on Housln and Urban Development, (hereinafter 
Task force Report queen 1 s Printer, January 1969. 
See AI 
(london: 
, R. K. and I.A. Cross: The Tactics of Resignation, 
Routiege and Kegan~Pau1 1967), pp. 37-53. 
). Note Trudeau•s strong empahsis on the need for rationalization In 
·government as expressed in hh essay, 1'federa1 ism, National ism and 
Reason11 In Trudeau. Pierre: Federalism and the French Canadians 
(Toronto: HacH111an of Canada, 1968). 
~. Note the account of Peter Newman of the last years of the Pearson 
Government especia11y Chapter 29 in The Distemper-of Our Times, 
(Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1968). 
5. an examination of the contrast In the style of governing, see 
Anthony Wes te 11. April 11, 1970, Winnipeg Free Press 11Trudeau: A 
After Two Yean 11 • 
6. , Force Report on Housing recorded on page 6: 11 1n quantitative and 
even qualitative terms, the achievements stnce 19~5 are Impressive. 
Forty-nine per cent of -the entire housing stock has been built 
during the period, the highest ratio of new housing additions in 
the entire Western World. In the years 19~5-1968 a tota1 of 2,838,251 
new units were bul1t tn Canada, 682,276 financed by approved lenders 
were under the insured lending provisions of the NHA and 371,331 financed 
dlrectey by CHHC 1oans. 11 Re~rt of the Federal Task Force on Housing 
and Urban Development. Queen s Printer, January 1969. 
1. In 1964 and 1965 there was an average of 165,000 housing starts. In 
1966 this fell to 134.474. The vacancy rates for apartments tn 
Toronto were 4% in 1966 and in 1968 Jess than 1%. Canadian Housing 
Statlstfcs, 1968. 
In 1969, the percentage of I~HA borrowers from the upper th t rd income 
group had increased to 44% from 1965 figure of 18%. The percentage 
of lower income families dropped from 18% in 1965 to 6%, in 1969 based 
on CHHC housing statistics. 
8. major proposals presented by Hr. Pearson and Hr. Nicholson, then 
Minister Responsible for Housing in their opening statement on 
December 11, 1967 were: 
- loans for open spaces and transportation _corridors 
- an expansion of land assembly programmes 
- contributions to the cost of regional planning 
·slightly higher NHA 1oans 
a counci1 on Housing and Urban Renewal 
,, 
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FOOTNOTES - 2 
was the opening statement by the Prime Minister to the 
Federal-Provincial Conference on Housing and Urban Development, 
Ottawa, December 11, 1967. 
9. See in icuiar He11yer 1 s speech to liberal members of Parliament 
March 27 9 1968. It is interesting to note that John Turner countered 
Hell 1 s idea of new citIes. and they engaged In one of the few 
debates on issues that occured during the llbera1 Leadership 
Campaign overshadowed as it was by personality politics. 
Hl •. See pages 6- 19 11 Emergence of a New Society11 , in Martin 9 Roseow C., 
''The Cities and the Federal System11 (New York: Atherton Press, 1965). 
11. Op. cit. 9 Federalism and the French Canadians, pages 79- 103. 
12. Glazer in describing American Presidential TaSk forces comments: 
11 ln this way the task force Indeed resembles a naval task force cut 
from the massive support and restrictions of its home bases and 
Its regu Jar chains of command1'. G I azer, Nathan: ''On Task Foret ng••, 
The Public lnterestt No. 15, Spring 1969, ·p. 41-42. 
1.1t. Bruce Doern: 98The Role of Royal Commissions in the General Polley 
Process and In federa1-Pro¥1ncial Re1ations 11 in Canadian Public Ad-
Ministration, December 1967, Vol. x. No.4, p. 417. 
15. for an examination that has been made of these changes see Anthony 
Weste1Jis series, April 14, 1970- 11Cabinet Secretariat Now Powerful 
E 11te11 • WInnipeg free Press. 
16. articulation of these can be gathered in statements made by 
He11yer in a Press Conference on August 16, in a speech delivered to 
Canadian Real Estate Board In Niagara falls, October 1 and In 
the preamble to the Task force Report. 
17. Glazer. op. cit •• Glazer points to these problems in the American 
·experience. 
18. See Schindeier, Fred and Lanphier, C. Michael: usocia1 Sdence 
Research Participatory Democracy in Canada11 in Canadian Public 
Administration. Winter, 1969. Vol. XII, No. 4. 
19. Task Force Report. 
members of the Task Force as Indicated in the Report were - 11 8ts 
lrman. Transport Minister Paul T. Hellyer, was himself the 
Min lster res pons ib ie for federa 1 housing policies; The remainder 
of its membership was drawn from the private sector, broadly re-
presentative of geographical regions of Canada and of the varied 
disclp1lnes and backgrounds most Intimately involved in the subjects 
under Inquiry. They were Dr. Doris Boyle of Sydney. Nova Scotia. an 
economist-sociologist on the faculty of Xavier College; ecologist 
I' 
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FOOTNOTES - 3 
of the University of Montreal's Institute of 
Carter of Montreal, Mortgage Controller of the 
of ; builder-developer Robert Campeau, President 
~•1np,,.u Corporation of Ottawa; Dr. James Gillies, a lend 
of the Faculty of Administrative Studies 9 York 
, Toronto; and C.E. Pratt, a senior partner of the 
architectural firm of Thompson, Berwick, Pratt and 
1iiem H. Neville of Ottawa was appointed Executive 
Task Force also was assisted by Alfred E. Coli, 
lve Director Central Mortgage and Housing Corporation, 
as CMHC Liaison Officer and by Lloyd Axworthy, Executive Assistant, 
(Housing) to Hr. Heilyer. 
21. a 1 1ar though earlier example, see Peter Newman 1 s discussion 
lter Gordon's use of outside advisors In the preparation of 
1963 budget the resulting reaction of the ctvfi service. 
"•mM•n~ op. cit., pages 13-)0. 
Doern points out In his study of Royal Commissions: 
Is, therefore& superimposed on the urgent need for viable 
23. See J. E. 
Querteriy 
1icy~maklng technique, a11 the problems of Inter· 
atlons and jurisdiction. This need is on a con-
See ~33& Canadian Public Administration, 
LX, no.~. 
u 11Shou1d Canada be Decommhsloned111 Queen 1s 
Winter 196~, p. 478. 
the re1at¥onship between Royal Commissions and 
, Charles J.: Guide to Declsfon: The Royal 
Jersey: Bedminster Press, 1965) pages 114-124. 
ite on Ta~atlon Is an attempt to introduce public 
discussion Into policy making without risking the standing of the 
Minister of Finance who may be forced to make changes. However~ 
White clearly was the product of the civil servants in the 
Mtnls Finance and Hr. Benson, who Is only acting as a spokesman 
e posltton created in the traditional fashion of Royal 
ission recommendations distilled by the civil servants. 
article by Anthony Westen "" 11Hasses Closer to Government11 , 
11 17, 1970 which highlights the criticisms of the existing 
tern of Cabinet government. 
111em: Po11tlcs of Hass Society, (Free Press 
id: ldeol?SY and Discontent, (Free Press of Glencoe) 196~. 
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FOOTNOTES .- 4 
of Our Cities - A Task Forc'ill View11 , a 
tan Association of Real Estate Board, Niagara 
' c t • 1 & 1968 • 
I; 
Schrag: 
moverawu11 t In 
Our Schoch Fan 1 s 
York for school decentralization, 
lnst the 11professlonah11 -
name of reform good 
i 1 to de 1 i ver the goods. In I u 
experts, the demand for decentralization 
to the city, a rejection of outside 
317 in Gltte11, i1yn and Hevest, 
Education, (New York: Praeger) 1970. 
teH: 11 IU mandarins ere Uttie known to 
1y respected and s~t1mes feared in the federal 
credited admirers with brtnglng a new 
policy-making, and accused by critics of 
I ng such outs t 
From 11Cablnet 
Free Press. 
Initiatives as Paul He11yer 1 s housing task 
Secretariat Now Power E1 he11 0 April 14. 1970, 
52 to 61 of Force. 
Force 
1 Cr hI of the E 1 hi st Theory of Democrau:y11 : 
ltlst democracy looks for the principal source of 
Innovation in ltlon among rival 1eaders and the c1erer 
maneuvering of iltlca1 entrepreneurs, which is 9 In Its view, the 
most distinctive of a democratic system. Because so many 
ltlca1 scientists worn the theoretical blinders of the 
t theory, howevere we have overlooked the importance of broadly 
u•:•au socla1 movements& artstng from the public at 1arge, as power-
of innovation change. 11 
initiatives 
Hlnhter in the 
new legislation were presented by the Prime 
following Paul He11yer 1s resignation and the 
on government 1 s poor handling of the housing 
em. See the House of Commons Debates, Friday~ April 25, 1969 • 
• 113p No. 136~ p. 7979. 
~Auwu"~ e of the foreign po1icy review where ministers Klerans 
leux ic1y took different positions, shows that It Is 
not possible to more freedom within our present system of 
cabinet government. 
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APPENDIX A 
The Task Force Appointed 
(HT A \VA, August 29, 19()8-Transport Minister 
Paul Hellyer, Minister responsible for federal hous-
ing policies, today announced the appointment of 
memocrs of the new federal Task Force on Housing 
and Urban Development. 
A'sisting the Minister in his examination of 
Canada\ urban problems will be Dr. Doris Boyle 
of SyJncy. Nova Scotia; Dr. Pierre Dansereau and 
W. Peter Caner, both of Montreal; Robert Campeau 
of Ottawa; Dr. James Gillies of Toronto; and C. E. 
Pr;att. !f"RAIC. of V;mcouvcr. 
Mr. Hellyer himself will serve as chairman of 
the Task Force which is scheduled to open a series 
of nationwide public hearings in Ottawa September 
111-17. 
William H. Neville of Ottawa has been appointed 
Executive Secretary of the Study. 
The Task Force will also be assisted by Alfred 
E. Coli, Executive Director of Central Mortgage 
and !-lousing Corporation, as CMHC liaison otlicer 
anJ by Uoyd Ax worthy, Executive As~istant ( Hous-
ing) h~ J\tr. Hellyer. 
l'urp<lSe of the Task Force is to examine housing 
:1ml urkm dcv.::lopment in Canada and to report 
,,n \1 ays in which the federal government. in com-
pany with other levels of government and the 
rrivate sector, can help meet the housing needs 
,,f ah C'nadians and contribute to the development 
nf mod..:rn vital cities. 
Dr. Boyle, a native of Baltimore. Md .. currently 
is a Prl,f..:ssor of Economics at Xavier Coll~ge 
in S) Jn..:y. Hold.:r of a dc)Ctontte in sociology and 
~~·,,u,llnics from Catholic U niv.:r~ity, \Va~hington, 
,1\~ w.1~ h.:aJ ,,f the So.:ial S.:icnces Department at 
St. Franci~ \a\i~r University, Antigonish, from 1950 
hl J'l.'i~ pri•1r w returning to Baltimore where sht.!' 
\> .1' a Prtlf.:ss,,r l>i EC<)OOmic~ ;.;.t Loyola U niver~ity. 
She came back to Canada last year to assume her 
present position. A frequent lecturer and commen-
tator on social and economic problems, she was 
married to the late Dr. George Boyle, noted author,· 
teacher and founder of the Antigonish Co-operative 
Movement. 
Mr. Carter, 39, came to Canada in 1957 from 
Britain where he holds a Fellowship of The In-
corporated Society of Valuers and Auctioneers. In 
1961 he became Senior Mortgage Officer of the 
Guaranty Trust Company. Between 1962 and 1966 
he was Assistant Vice-President of Canadian 
Acceptance Corporation and General Manager of 
CAC Realty, its mortgage subsidiary. Since 1966 be 
has been Mortgage Controller of the Royal Bank of 
Canada. Mr. Carter is a Corporate Member of the·--
Association of Ontario Land Economists and a 
former member of the Mortgage Advisory Board 
to the Ontario Government. 
Dr. Dansereau, 57, graduated from the University 
of Montreal and subsequently obtained his doctorate 
in botany from the University of Geneva. A Fellow 
of the Royal Society of Canada and a Guggenheim 
Fellow, he has lectured and taught at a number of 
major institutions, including the University of Mont-
real, MacDonald College, University of Otago, New 
Zealand, University of Michigan and Columbia . 
University. In 1955 he was appointed Dean of the 
Faculty of Science and Director of the Botanical 
Institute at the University of Montreal. Currently 
h..: is Professor ·of Ecology in the University's In-
stitute of Urbanism. Dr. Dansereau is the author 
of s.:veral r.:search studies in the field of botany 
and ecology and has participated in a number of 
international conferenc..:s on environmental Pft-ib-
lems. This year he convened a :-.ympo!>ium on ··The 
Challenge for Survival: Land. Air. and Wakr in 
lvfcgatopolis'' at Rockefeller University and the 
i""'w York llot:mical Gardens. 
r. r. Campc;nl. 44, is the President of Campeau 
Corpur:11 in,; Limited. a major Ottawa construction-
tkwlormcnt firm which has built more than 10.000 
lwu,in!! units 'incc 1950. He also developed the 
$ 10.000,000 Place de Ville complex in the down-
town area of the capital. Mr. Campeau is a member 
of the Board of Governors of Laurentian University 
in Sudbury, a member of the Advisory Board of 
(iuaranty Trust Company of Canada, and' Chair-
man of the Fund-Raising Committee for the new 
Children's Hospital of Eastern Ontario. 
Dr. Giliies. 44, obtained his Bachelor of Arts 
Dcrree in .Economics from the University of 
Western Ontario, his Masters from Brown 
Univcr~ity and his doctorate in economics from 
indiana University. A former Professor of Urban 
I 'c<'nt•mics at the U nivcrsity of California. he served 
a~ Vicc-Ch:tirman of the Redevelopment Agency of 
Los Angeles and an adviser to the California Com-
mission on Metropolitan Problems. Now Dean of 
the Faculty of Administrative Studies at York Uni-
versity, he is a director of the American Real 
Estate and Urban Economics Association, the Cana-
dian Council on Urban and Regional Research, and 
the lnstitute of Canadian Bankers as well as a 
member of the Export Advisory Council to the 
Minister of Trade and Commerce. 
Mr. Pratt graduated from the University of 
Toronto's School of Architecture in 1938. After 
wartime service with the Royal Canadian Air Force, 
he formed the Vancouver architectural firm Thomp-
son, Berwick, Pratt and Partners with which he still 
is associated. He is a Fellow of the Royal Archi-
tectural Institute of Canada, an Honorary Fellow 
of the Architectural Institute of America, and a 
former President of the Architectural Institute of 
British Columbia. He was a member of the three-
man Committee of Inquiry into Design of Residen-
tial Environment established by the Royal Archi-
tectural Institute of Canada and also served on 
the jury for the Toronto City Hall competition. His 
design of the University of British Columbia 
Gymnasium and the Thea Koerner Graduate Centre 
at UBC won Massey Medals in 1952 and 1962 
respectively. 
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